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ABSTRACT 
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 designated the Coast Guard as the lead federal 
agency tasked with building Interagency Operations Centers in critical U.S. ports. A 
critical component of the IOC initiative is an Information Management System (IMS) to 
provide improved means for information sharing, and coordination among federal, state, 
local, and public sector stakeholders related to maritime safety and security in critical 
U.S. ports. The Coast Guard WatchKeeper project is a proposed IMS being designed to 
address the information sharing and information management challenges faced by these 
agencies. The WatchKeeper development program has faced challenges in delivering 
capability. Initial capability was to be delivered in 2009. This did not happen. Up to 
today, WatchKeeper has not delivered any new capabilities. Several development 
practices may provide advantages to the development process–ensuring value adding 
capabilities, minimizing project risk, and ensuring Coast Guard leadership can understand 
how WatchKeeper capabilities support Coast Guard core business process. This thesis 
describes these development practices, and proposes an architectural consideration to 
provide focus to future WatchKeeper products. This thesis concludes with considerations 
for further developing WatchKeeper, and recommendations for moving forward with 
development. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2006, Congress tasked the United States Coast Guard with building 
Interagency Operations Centers to support enhanced collaboration and information 
sharing among port partners within the critical ports of the United States. The Coast 
Guard recognized a need for improved situational awareness, coordination of maritime 
operations, and integrated vessel targeting. WatchKeeper is a proposed information 
management system intended to deliver capabilities to support these objectives.  
WatchKeeper development faces many challenges. The first segment of 
WatchKeeper was scheduled to deliver initial capability in December of 2009. The 
WatchKeeper project did not meet this projected delivery date. Second, the Coast Guard 
is in the midst of integrating an organization-wide enterprise architecture requiring all 
information systems to comply with developing standards, practices, and procedures. 
Presently, the WatchKeeper development project has nine million dollars to spend to 
build this information management system–a relatively small amount considering the 
complexity of this endeavor.  
This thesis provides an analysis of WatchKeeper–the context surrounding its 
development, the systems architecture, and the potential risks present within its 
development. 
Three primary practices can be applied to support WatchKeeper development, 
which can provide structure, meaning, and value to the WatchKeeper project: Enterprise 
Architecture, Software Architecture, and Software Architecture Evaluation. This thesis 
reviews literature from leading experts in the field of IT and software development and 
makes recommendations accordingly.  
Furthermore, ensuring valuable information can be delivered minimizing 
“information glut,” requires a new approach to information delivery. One such approach 
is “Valuable Information at the Right Time” (VIRT) (Hayes-Roth, 2005). This thesis 
provides an architecture proposal that considers the Watch-stander day-to-day operations 
developed using VIRT methodologies and constructs.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
A critical need exists for federal, state, and local agencies to share information, 
and improve the coordination of maritime operations. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 
addresses this need by designating the Coast Guard as lead agency for developing an 
environment, which facilitates this need and enhance existing maritime operation 
capabilities in major U.S. ports. The SAFE Port Act specifically directs the development 
of Inter-agency Operations Centers (IOC’s) for this purpose. One aspect of the IOC 
initiative that presents a major challenge to the effectiveness of maritime operations is 
information sharing among maritime centric organizations. Information sharing among 
federal, state, and local agencies requires both political and technical strategies that 
consider the political environments, technical environments, and capabilities of 
participating agencies. The Coast Guard has proposed the development of an Information 
Management System (IMS), presently referred to as WatchKeeper, to address these 
challenges. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary purpose for this thesis is to analyze the strategy, architectural design, 
and development approach of the Coast Guard WatchKeeper Information Management 
System primarily to answer the following questions: (1) what are the significant 
challenges facing the Coast Guard in developing this IMS? (2) Is the Coast Guard 
leveraging best practices (as identified by research) to develop WatchKeeper? (3) What is 
the primary focus of the WatchKeeper development approach? (4) How might the 
WatchKeeper development team ensure the right capabilities are delivered to their 
customers? Secondarily, conducting this research (1) provides a better understanding of 
the context in which WatchKeeper is being developed; (2) develops a refined 




developing complex IT systems as they relate to methods being employed in the 
development of WatchKeeper; and (4) facilitates conclusions and recommendations 
based on findings.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis begins by first describing the context surrounding WatchKeeper 
development–the Coast Guard’s missions, importance of providing safety and security 
within major U.S. ports, historic events leading to WatchKeeper, and policies providing 
impetus for WatchKeeper. Chapter II also describes challenges facing WatchKeeper 
development. Chapter III provides a literature review covering current, fundamental 
Information Technology (IT) practices. The research conducted for this thesis suggests 
that the methods covered in the literature review are essential for promoting effective IT 
development within organizations–specifically, these methods relate directly to the 
ongoing Coast Guard Enterprise Architecture initiative (in general) and the WatchKeeper 
development project–Enterprise Architecture (EA), Software Architecture (SA), and 
Software Architecture Evaluation (SEA). Chapter IV discusses the challenge of 
information from national level policies, and presents an approach described in one of the 
literature resources. Chapter V explains the WatchKeeper development approach, 
development constraints, development requirements, and existing architectural plans. 
Chapter VI presents an architectural proposal that aligns with methodologies covered in 
the literature review–specifically, it provides a scenario, which describes, in detail, the 
general operating environment in which WatchKeeper is to be deployed. This proposal 
suggests a shift in perspective from focusing on specific functional requirements to 
shared situational awareness, and information sharing as they relate to past, present, and 
future time domains. In conclusion, this chapter presents potential considerations for 
further developing a WatchKeeper framework and components. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
For the purposes of fulfilling the research objectives of this thesis, the following 
methods were used. 
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 Literature review of topics that support the development of value adding 
IT capabilities 
 Data gathering from Coast Guard offices specifically tasked with 
WatchKeeper development 
 Application of methods researched 
 Development of conclusions and recommendations based on research 
 4
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II. WATCHKEEPER BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
A. ENVIRONMENT  
The maritime environment is a complex environment, which requires the attention 
of vast numbers of stakeholders–from fishermen to longshoreman; recreational boaters to 
tanker captains; military forces to conservationists and tribal fisherman. Basically, 
anyone who lives near the water or benefits from commerce enabled by it, is a 
stakeholder. This environment is risky and fraught with hazards. Maintaining order, 
safety, and protection of people and property in this domain requires some form of 
coordination among these stakeholders. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for 
maritime security, and as such, provides five unique services. 
1. Maritime Safety: Minimize deaths, injuries, and property damage 
associated with maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational boating.  
2. Maritime Security: Protect America's maritime borders from intrusions by: 
(a) halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the United 
States through maritime routes, (b) preventing illegal fishing, and (c) 
suppressing violations of federal law in the maritime arena. 
3. Maritime Mobility: Facilitate maritime commerce and eliminate 
interruptions and impediments to the efficient and economical movement 
of goods and people, while maximizing recreational access to the water. 
4. National Defense: Defend the nation as one of the five U.S. armed 
services. Enhance regional stability in support of the National Security 
Strategy, utilizing the Coast Guard’s unique and relevant maritime 
capabilities. 
5. Protection of Natural Resources: Eliminate environmental damage and the 
degradation of natural resources associated with maritime transportation, 
fishing, and recreational boating (USCG, 2001).  
There are 22 major container ports in the United States (Safe Port Act, 2006). 
These ports are the gateways for the U.S. economy exports and imports. Consider the 
Port of Long Beach–“In 2006 the Port moved more than $100 billion in goods. It 
supported about 1.4 million jobs in the U.S. and generated about $15 billion in annual 
trade-related wages” (Port of Long Beach, 2009). Safety, security, and continuous flow of  
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commerce are critical to the livelihoods of millions of people. Temporarily shutting down 
a port (or some portion of it) would cost multiple billions of dollars; completely shutting 
down a port could have catastrophic consequences.  
September 11, 2001 created fears concerning the security of ports critical to U.S. 
infrastructure. How could terrorism infiltrate U.S. borders—U.S. ports? If a terrorist or a 
group of terrorists wished to strike at the welfare of Americans, a major U.S. port would 
certainly seem a likely target. The threat of terrorism became a new problem and risk 
domain for all maritime stakeholders. Information sharing and cross-agency collaboration 
became important considerations for future federal government responses. This event 
alone thrust the Coast Guard into one of the greatest organizational and social changes 
ever experienced by an armed service of the United States–becoming the armed service 
for a brand new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including taking on new 
counter-terrorism responsibilities, becoming active participants in the Global War On 
Terror (GWOT); the list goes on. Approximately 40,000 strong, the U.S. Coast Guard 
must manage to balance budgets, and mission requirements with ever-increasing 
demands. . 
In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast requiring an 
unprecedented response from federal agencies. Once again, the federal government had 
been struck by catastrophe. Coordination among federal, state, and local agencies, during 
this incident, was almost non-existent (Executive Office of the President, 2006). 
Immediately after, interoperable communications, collaboration, and information sharing, 
became an order mandated by the federal government (DHS, 2008). Once again, 
catastrophe stimulated change; the federal government suddenly realized how vulnerable 
ports and waterways are to natural disasters. Agencies–federal, state, and local–had to do 
a better job of collaborating and sharing information. What was once a given 
responsibility, disaster response, recovery, and mitigation, became another government-
wide mandate.  
The inherent complexities and risks associated with the maritime environment, 
and the significant events that have occurred in recent history, initiated new, government-
wide strategies and policies that require collaborative, information sharing environments 
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within the maritime domain. One such strategy, “Department of Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Strategy,” describes DHS’s strategy for addressing the challenges of 
developing these environments. “The National Strategy and the updated 2007 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security envision a coordinated and integrated Information 
Sharing Environment to effectively fight terrorism and respond to man-made and natural 
disasters. Both strategies give DHS a central role in ensuring that critical information is 
shared rapidly to the fullest extent allowed by law.” This document also recognizes the 
role the Coast Guard plays in developing this environment. “Over the past two years, 
DHS has launched a number of initiatives and pilots to increase operational information 
sharing, including but not limited to: … the Coast Guard-led Inter-agency Operational 
Centers…”  
The Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime security. Federal, state, and local 
agencies (including Department of Defense (DoD)), have been mandated to comply with 
the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. Within this act, 
Congress specifically directs the creation of Interagency Operations Centers (IOC’s) in 
all high-priority ports by 2009. Congress appropriated $60 million for each fiscal year 
from 2006 through 2012 to accomplish this task (SAFE Port Act, 2006). 
B. PROBLEM CHARACTERIZATION 
Presently, federal, state, and local agencies do not have the capacity to collect and 
process the increasing amount of information required to meet the challenges of 
interagency coordination and maritime security. Every individual agency that participates 
in maritime safety and security operations collects its own information, develops and 
employs its own processes for operating, and owns and maintains separate, stove-piped, 
networks of data and application resources. Developing an information sharing 
architecture that provides access to organizationally and geographically disparate, 
technology resources is a challenging endeavor. To develop such an architecture requires 
buy-in from agencies that own and manage data and functionality critical to maritime 
operations. To add further to the challenge of such an initiative, every port presents its 
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own unique set of challenges as the lists of participating agencies differ widely from port 
to port. The level of agency coordination and participation is drastically varied as well.  
The Coast Guard has been tasked with leading the development of a new, 
collaborative, port safety and security environment for IOC’s (SAFE Port Act, 2006). 
Their proposed solution for addressing this task is to build an Information Management 
System (system of systems)–conceptually called “WatchKeeper.”  
To begin, the IOC initiative describes three major components that need to be 
developed to realize collaborative, interagency operations: (1) facilities, (2) an 
information management system, and (3) a network of sensors. WatchKeeper is intended 
to address the IMS portion of the greater IOC initiative. 
The stated objectives of WatchKeeper are to provide: (1) Integrated Vessels 
Targeting (IVT), (2) Interagency Operational Planning (IOP), and (3) Operations 
Monitoring (OM). Presently, these IT capabilities do not exist. The Coast Guard 
identified these high-level, functional, requirements as primary focus areas for the 
proposed IMS. These objectives would address critical gaps in maritime security; thus, 
fulfilling the broad requirements set by SAFE Port Act of 2006. The latest design 
document explicitly defined the design objective to be the following: “Development and 
deployment of the Information Management System (conceptually called WatchKeeper), 
to improve the capability to see, understand, and share tactical information critical to 
security and interagency coordination in vulnerable ports and coastal areas…” (C2CEN 
WatchKeeper Detailed Design, 2008). 
A vast number of organizations constitute maritime security. Agencies that have 
been identified by the SAFE Port Act of 2006 to participate in IOC activities include the 
U.S. Coast Guard (as lead), Customs and Border Patrol, Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Justice, Department 
of Defense, other federal agencies, state and local government and law enforcement 
agencies, port security personnel, members of the Area Maritime Security Committee 
(AMSC), and other public and private stakeholders adversely affected by a transportation  
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security incident or transportation disruption. Developing a system of systems that 
provides a medium for sharing information and coordinating interagency activities to all 
of these stakeholders is a monumental task.  
With such a high volume of daily activity in so many different mission 
areas, the Coast Guard faces a daunting information and communication 
problem. It needs to efficiently process and effectively utilize large 
amounts of varied information that typically originates from unplanned 
events. Unfortunately the Coast Guard is burdened with an information 
technology (IT) infrastructure composed of standalone applications and 
communications networks that lack interoperability. The combination of 
heterogeneous missions, applications, and networks creates information 
sharing problems within the Coast Guard and with external entities that 
result in operational inefficiency and ineffectiveness. In addition the Coast 
Guard has become an integral part of the rapidly evolving, extended 
homeland security enterprise that spans multiple federal departments and 
reaches out to many state and local government agencies. This means the 
4 information sharing needs of the Coast Guard are ever growing and will 
be increasingly influenced by its partners, both within the federal 
government and beyond. (Creigh, Dash, 2007) 
To add to the complexity of the information sharing challenge, there are vast 
differences between present capabilities, and present collaborative environments that 
exist within the many Coast Guard command centers today. Some Coast Guard 
operations centers are fraught with technologies, from audio/video-feeds to monitors that 
span tens of feet, touch screen, digital audio/video interfaces, multiple communications 
interfaces, and complex presentation technologies. Yet, some command centers provide 
just enough capability to support Coast Guard operations alone. Most activity occurring 
in a command center today is directed toward sifting through vast amounts of information 
for developing a picture of events presently unfolding and anticipating events expected or 
planned for within the next 24-hour watch cycle. “Information Glut” (Hayes-Roth, 2005) 
is inhibiting the Watch-stander’s ability to consider best alternatives. This only describes 
the Coast Guard command center environment and does not provide insight into other 




Presently, information sharing between agencies is primarily accomplished 
through face-to-face interaction, or through telephone conversations. To describe the 
complexity of these issues further, in metro Seattle alone, approximately 30 different 
operations/communications centers exist that are concerned with events occurring in the 
maritime environment. How much information is being shared? How much operational 
coordination is occurring? Who needs what information?  
As of now, no other agencies are formally involved in the development of 
WatchKeeper. Other agencies engaged in maritime safety and security must become 
partial owners of the WatchKeeper system to ensure the successful deployment of a 
product that delivers value to all participants. Data-sharing agreements must be made 
between organizations; architectural decisions must be negotiated; semantics discussed 
and agreed upon; responsibility for maintenance and further development must be 
accepted by more than one agency for this proposed IMS to gain credibility. All of these 
factors must be considered in the overall architecture of such an IT centric, collaborative 
initiative.  
Enterprise Architecture (EA) provides a means for organizations to view their 
existing IT capabilities, and map these capabilities to core business processes. This is a 
necessary step in the technological evolution of organizations. Many benefits to 
developing an EA exist. Two specific benefits are (1) the ability to identify the value of 
existing IT capabilities, and (2) the ability to plan for future, value-generating, IT 
initiatives strategically. The risks for not developing an EA are many and significant. 
First, an organization that cannot directly link its IT capabilities with its core business 
processes cannot understand the impact IT is having on its overall organizational 
performance. This often results in limitations or declinations in performance. 
Organizations may be supporting multiple, geographically dispersed IT capabilities that 
provide the same or similar services but that are cost, and data silos. Not only does this 
condition affect organizational performance, it also creates virtual roadblocks for 
technological advancement by making the process of standardization, and process 
reengineering extremely difficult. Data and processes must be merged and standardized 
so that new technologies can be built upon an understandable architecture; thus, ensuring 
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an organization is gaining the maximum value from its IT initiatives by guaranteeing 
every capability that exists and is planned for maps to the organization’s strategic 
objectives.  
Presently, the Coast Guard is in the process of implementing an EA. This presents 
a significant risk to the WatchKeeper development project. The Architecture 
WatchKeeper must consider the requirements and objectives being developed for the 
overarching enterprise architecture. WatchKeeper is intended to be a 20-year life cycle 
project (Assistant Commandant For Capability, USCG, 2009). The design must be robust 
and flexible enough to adjust to the Coast Guard’s long-term IT strategy as doing so 
requires a design that fits organizational needs–both present and future. An example of 
inconsistent design, which is counter to EA principles, is that current design documents 
suggest data feeds exist from back-end data connections providing resources to proposed 
WatchKeeper products. This design is counter to WatchKeeper proposed designs, which 
are based on Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles. To standardize 
information-sharing techniques to create a robust and logical architecture, all data 
connections should be built using SOA practices rather than a patchwork of ad hoc data 
connections that lack sufficient documentation.  
C. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 
According to Ross, et al., it is critical for an organization to build a “Foundation 
for Execution”–the IT infrastructure and digitized business processes that automate its 
core capabilities (p. 4). Building a solid foundation for execution is essential for 
organizations to leverage IT effectively. The value of building a foundation for execution 
can be described in the following context: mundane, routine, business processes are 
automated so that an organization “… can concentrate on achieving greatness” (p. 3). For 
the Coast Guard, this means core processes are automated so operators can focus on 
achieving the highest levels of performance.  
Ross et al. describes three key disciplines for building an effective foundation for 
execution: (1) Operating model, (2) Enterprise Architecture (EA), and (3) IT engagement 
model. For the purposes of this thesis, EA is the primary discipline discussed.  
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It is necessary to understand the fundamental concepts surrounding Enterprise 
Architecture (EA) to leverage technology within a large organization effectively.  
…enterprise architecture, the organizing logic for core business processes 
and IT infrastructure reflecting the standardization and integration of a 
company’s operating model. The enterprise architecture provides a long-
term view of a company’s processes, systems, and technologies so that 
individual projects can build capabilities–not just fulfill immediate needs. 
(Ross, Weill, Robertson, 2006)  
Ross et al. describes enterprise architecture as the logic behind the relationship 
between IT and core business processes. This relationship requires some level of process 
and technology standardization to support an organization’s operating model. Ross et al. 
defines “operating model” as “…the necessary level of business process integration and 
standardization for delivering goods and services to customers” (p. 25). The authors 
identify four general operating models: Coordination, Unification, Diversification, and 
Replication. Without describing the details specific to each model, it is important to note 
that the Coast Guard might consider identifying and fully understanding its operating 
model to assist in the development of its EA. An EA, in turn, would provide a more 
meaningful context for a software architecture, which supports WatchKeeper objectives 
(previously defined). Ross et al. lists keys to effective EA, “…to identify processes, data, 
technologies, and customer interfaces that take the operating model from vision to 
reality” (p. 46). 
In July of 2009, DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of 
the Coast Guard’s EA implementation. It identified both strengths and weaknesses of the 
current Coast Guard EA implementation project. It is important to note that, according to 
the OIG, the Coast Guard has not yet fully implemented an EA across the organization. 
This raises a concern for the development of WatchKeeper. How can such an initiative be 
fully aligned with an EA that does not exist?  
The following is an excerpt from the OIG report describing critical components 
missing from the current Coast Guard EA. 
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“The Coast Guard has not fully integrated its enterprise architecture. 
Integration is needed to show how the data from various major information 
systems fits together. There are 3 profiles, 3 models, and 7 inventories for the 
enterprise architecture that have not been completed. The 3 profiles not completed 
are:  
1.  C4&IT Performance Profile: The C4&IT performance metrics as 
they relate to the DHS performance areas and federal enterprise 
architecture Business Reference Model.  
2.  Balanced Scorecard for C4&IT: An overview of Coast Guard 
C4&IT performance related to business process, learning and 
growth, customers, and finances.  
3.  External Services Profile: Provides a high-level view of systems 
leveraged at the Coast Guard but managed outside the Coast 
Guard.  
The 3 models not completed are:  
1.  Unified Performance Logic Model: A framework for planning, 
managing, measuring, and evaluating Coast Guard enterprise 
architecture programs. It illustrates the cause and effect linkages 
between program activities and outcome results.  
2.  Business Models: Displays Coast Guard enterprise architecture 
business activities and can be used to identify dependencies, 
redundancies, and gaps between the Coast Guard’s activities  
3.  Applications to Business Activities Matrix: Describes the 
relationship between Coast Guard services and activities 
The 7 inventories not completed are:  
1.  Functional Statements: Describes the roles and missions of the 
Coast Guard headquarters offices.  
2.  Information Inventory: Shows all information objects, produced, 
archived, and/or required for Coast Guard enterprise architecture 
activities, reporting, and decision making, and their relationship 
within the DHS Conceptual Data Model.  
3.  Information Exchange Matrix: Identifies the information transfers 
that are necessary to achieve Coast Guard tasks.  
4.  Information Dictionary: Identifies, defines, and provides additional 
data to describe items listed in the information inventory.  
 14
5.  Services Inventory: Aligns Coast Guard applications and systems 
to the federal enterprise architecture. As such, it helps to explain 
the services offered by each of the Coast Guard's applications and 
systems.  
6.  External Services Inventory: Describes systems managed outside 
the Coast Guard and is organized by grouping applications to 
systems. The content includes attributes across each of the six 
Coast Guard perspectives and provides a baseline mapping assets 
to the DHS and federal enterprise architectures.  
7.  Frequency Spectrum Inventory: Lists the frequency spectrums 
necessary for the Coast Guard’s mission operations” (Department 
of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2009). 
Therefore, it is difficult to describe, with sufficient detail, the core business 
processes that define the organization and its core capabilities as a whole (processes 
which the Coast Guard must do right to be effective). The Operational Requirements 
Document (OPORD) developed for IOC/WatchKeeper does identify core capabilities 
necessary for the proposed IOC’s. These core capabilities might be seen as core business 
processes: (1) integrated vessel targeting, (2) interagency operational planning, and (3) 
operations monitoring. Furthermore, the OPORD identifies existing components that 
should support these capabilities. It also proposes a framework for which these 
components deliver these capabilities. Thus, to define the IOC’s operating model, the 
following questions must be asked: (1) what specific business processes is the Coast 
Guard attempting to integrate? (2) what specific business processes does the Coast Guard 
need to standardize? and (3) what level of standardization and integration can the Coast 
Guard achieve given the uniqueness of each of the 22 major ports?  
In summary, the challenges for the Coast Guard in developing and fully 
leveraging the capabilities of an information sharing environment, such as WatchKeeper, 
are: (1) establishing a foundation for execution, (2) fully understanding its operating 
model, (3) developing an EA that supports its operating model, and (4) to develop a 
method of IT governance that ensures future IT decisions are guided by its EA software 
architecture. The WatchKeeper IMS must be aligned with the EA currently being 
established by the Coast Guard’s Chief Architect Office of EA and Governance. This 
issue is discussed in further detail.  
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D. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE  
Currently, software architecture is an essential practice for developing complex 
software systems. The need for software architecture became evident with the ever-
increasing size and complexity of software systems. According to Clements, Kazman, 
Klein (2002), three reasons exist why software architecture is important to large and 
complex software systems: (1) it facilitates communication among stakeholders and 
makes it easier for them to understand and participate in the design process, (2) it brings 
important design decision to light early in the development stage. Software architecture is 
largely a visible and understandable view of a proposed system, and a common language 
for describing the systems properties, components, and structures (Bass, Clement, 
Kazman, 1998). Establishing software architecture early on allows individuals involved 
in the development process to discuss their different perspectives and concerns, 
potentially identifying conflicting system requirements, such as security vs. accessibility, 
or cost constraints vs. desired functionality, and (3) “It is a reusable, transferable 
abstraction of a system” (Clements, Kazman, Klein, 2002). Clements et al. contend that 
software architecture creates a model for other applications to be developed rather than 
starting from scratch with each new product. This provides alignment among all software 
products throughout an organization, which is usually referred to as software product 
lines. Clements et al. provide the following definition of software architecture. “The 
software architecture of a program of computing system is the structure or structures of 
the system, which comprise software components, the externally visible properties of 
those components, and the relationships among them” (Bass, Clements, Kazman, 1998). 
The Coast Guard Commandant Instruction M5234.4–Coast Guard Software 
Development and Documentation Standards (CG-SDDS) provides specific guidelines for 
the development and documentation of software. It does not, however, discuss the 
purpose for or the importance of developing software architecture–software architecture 
is only briefly mentioned throughout the document. However, WatchKeeper 
documentation does provide general software architecture artifacts, such as diagrams that 
depict high-level data connections. The documentation provided for this thesis does not  
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provide enough evidence to suggest one, complete, software architecture exists for 
WatchKeeper. It is difficult to assert that software architecture is not being used to build 
mutual understanding among developers and stakeholders for this project.  
E. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION (SAE) 
A Software Architecture Evaluation (SAE) is a way to evaluate how well a design 
addresses the requirements identified by stakeholders and developers. Evaluating the 
architecture provides insight into a proposed system’s strengths and weaknesses. 
According to Clements et al., “Architecture is a cheap way to avoid disaster.” Software 
architecture evaluation tests the components and framework of the architecture to 
uncover potential problems with its design, and identify trade-off points between 
competing requirements.  
Literature, concerning software architecture, often refers to the qualities of a 
software system as “Quality Attributes” QA, such as functionality, maintainability, or 
scalability–qualities the system should posses. “Quality attributes form the basis for 
architectural evaluation…” (Clements, Kazman, Klien, 2002, p. 32). By identifying a 
system’s quality attributes, components, and the architectural style, the system designers 
can identify how a proposed architecture achieves these qualities, and in turn, identifying 
the risks which Clements et al. describe as, “…potentially problematic architectural 
decisions…” (p. 34).  
Ultimately, software architecture identifies whether or not an architecture is 
suitable for the purpose in which it was designed. According to Clements et al., a design 
is suitable if it meets two criteria: (1) the system that is build based on the architecture 
will meet the quality goals of QA’s identified, and (2) it is “buildable” (Clements et al., p. 
27). 
SAE should take place during the beginning phases of WatchKeeper 
development. No mention of SAE appears in the WatchKeeper Segment one project plan. 
Some critical risks associated with failing to conduct SAE in the early phases of design 
are the following. 
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1. Not having the ability to communicate critical design factors to 
stakeholders 
2. Misidentification of critical design priorities, trade-offs, potential design 
constraints, and vulnerabilities 
3. Developing a system that cannot meet its quality objectives 
F. CONCLUSION 
Congress has mandated that the Coast Guard produce an interagency environment 
for critical ports within the U.S., which would enhance the nation’s ability to respond to 
maritime threats–both natural, and human. Presently, federal, state, and local agencies do 
not have the capacity to collect and process the increasing amount of information 
required to meet the challenges of interagency coordination and maritime security. The 
Coast Guard, recognizing the need to address these issues, initiated the development of 
the WatchKeeper–Information Management System. WatchKeeper is being designed to 
meet three primary objectives intended to enhance interagency coordination and response 
effectiveness in major ports: (1) Integrated Vessels Targeting (IVT), (2) Interagency 
Operational Planning (IOP), and (3) Operations Monitoring (OM). Information sharing, 
however, presents a significant challenge to the development of WatchKeeper, which was 
initially scheduled to be delivered with a baseline of capability by 2009 but has not yet 
been deployed. As of now, no formal partners are involved in WatchKeeper 
development. WatchKeeper is at risk of not being accepted by other agencies that should 
be participating in the development, and benefiting from its proposed capabilities.  
The Coast Guard is presently developing and implementing an overarching EA. 
This presents a challenge for WatchKeeper design in that it must take into consideration 
design factors affecting its relationship to enterprise strategic IT initiatives. The design 
must consider EA standards, and policies to ensure its alignment with Coast Guard IT 
strategies. 
Information sharing within WatchKeeper consists of a VPN connection for port 
partners. The term information sharing is somewhat misleading. Today, information 
sharing, in terms of current technology, is usually built on services that push and pull data 
from disparate resources using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles. VPN 
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connections in the Coast Guard today are primarily established by older token 
technologies; however, a transition is underway to establish a newer form of secure 
network access that still falls short of a true service-based system (Dash, 2010). 
Enterprise Architecture provides a foundation for organizations to leverage the 
value of IT fully. The Coast Guard is presently implementing EA. WatchKeeper is 
intended to have a 20-year life cycle. An information management system of such size 
and complexity must be designed in accordance with proposed EA standards and 
objectives. By developing a robust and logical software architecture that meets Coast 
Guard EA standards and objectives, WatchKeeper can map its capabilities to Coast 
Guard, overarching, IT strategies–ensuring its credibility and survivability as a major IT 
system. 
Logically, EA, SA, and SAE provide a layered approach to obtaining the most 
value from major IT initiatives. EA provides an as-is state of organizational IT 
capabilities, which, in turn, provides organizations with an opportunity to assess the value 
of these capabilities. If capabilities are redundant or do not align with organizational 
strategic objectives, they should be eliminated from the organization’s IT portfolio to 
ensure the alignment of IT capabilities with core business processes and strategies. EA 
also provides a meaningful context for new IT initiatives in that it clearly defines IT 
needs and opportunities for both current and future capabilities. Software architecture in 
itself is nothing more than a sub architecture existing within the EA. A thorough, well-
designed, software architecture delivers a needed capability that can be mapped directly 
to the EA. SA provides a means for developers and stakeholders to conduct meaningful 
discussions concerning the intended purpose and design of software capabilities. SA is a 
process for identifying software components and frameworks primarily to describe 
components that interact to deliver value to stakeholders. SAE should be conducted 
during the initial phases of software development. It supports both the SA and EA by 
evaluating proposed systems, in turn, identifying potential design constraints, decisions, 
and tradeoff points, which affect the value of delivered products. SAE is essentially a risk 
mitigation method for eliciting design flaws early on; –thus, minimizing the cost of 
addressing design flaws in later stages of development where costs of rework increase. 
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Although artifacts of software architecture for WatchKeeper exist, documentation is 
limited, making any assertions as to the quality or existence of an official software 
architecture difficult. 
Is the Coast Guard leveraging best practices (as identified by research) to develop 
WatchKeeper? It is evident that the Coast Guard is attempting to apply best practices in 
the development of WatchKeeper; however, it is not readily apparent that any formal 
process exists to ensure these practices are priorities or that these practices yield value as 
depicted in literature. 
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III. WATCHKEEPER OVERVIEW 
Data sharing is today’s principal Information Technology challenge. All 
sectors—commercial, government, academic, and military—seek 
improved information exchange to achieve operational benefits, whether 
in the form of greater profits, improved situational awareness, intellectual 
advancement, or ability to respond to threats endangering respective 
interests. Nations and organizations within and across nations have set 
forth policies to promote greater data sharing, but often without 
empowering or enabling change agents to introduce measurably better 
capabilities. (Hayes-Roth, Pullen, Blais, Brutzman, 2008) 
A. INFORMATION SHARING AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
Information sharing is critical to homeland security. Both September 11 and 
Hurricane Katrina provided valuable lessons and insight into two different but related 
perspectives concerning the value of information sharing as a critical requirement to 
safety and security. September 11 exposed existing weaknesses in the government’s 
capability to share information as it pertains to preventing terrorism. Katrina, on the other 
hand, revealed gaps in the U.S.’s ability to share, coordinate, and disseminate information 
during natural disasters (United States, Executive Office of the President, 2006).  
Since these events, many documents and policies have been written that directly 
improved information sharing throughout all levels of government. However, these 
documents and policies do not provide enough information for agencies to develop 
succinct information sharing capabilities. What are the critical components to a national 
information sharing architecture? How do agencies align their information sharing 
initiatives? The National Strategy for Information Sharing describes the U.S. 
government’s vision of how information sharing is to evolve. 
Improving information sharing in the post–September 11 world requires 
an environment that supports the sharing of information across all levels 
of government, disciplines, and security domains. As with our 
achievements to date, an improved information sharing environment will 
not be constructed overnight, but rather will evolve over time and will be 
the fruit of careful cultivation. An improved information sharing 
environment also will be constructed upon a foundation of trusted 
partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector, and our  
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foreign allies—partnerships based on a shared commitment to detect, 
prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism. (National 
Strategy for Information Sharing, 2007) 
This vision presents an even greater challenge–the construction of an information-
sharing environment built upon trusted partnerships that include the private sector and 
foreign allies. Not only do government agencies need to build information-sharing 
relationships and capabilities among themselves, they must also consider developing 
relationships with the private sector, and foreign allies.  
Two critical aspects to information sharing, relating to homeland security not 
mentioned in the National Strategy for Information Sharing are: (1) similarities between 
information sharing strategies and requirements pertaining to disaster mitigation, 
response, and recovery, and those associated with terrorism prevention, and (2) the 
information policy, and technology challenges and opportunities that either foster or 
inhibit improved information sharing. 
Similarities between homeland security disaster response and homeland security 
terrorism prevention efforts are worth mentioning. When building relationships for 
improved information sharing, as envisioned by the National Strategy for Information 
sharing, it is clear that most of the agencies involved in terrorism prevention are the same 
agencies involved in disaster mitigation, response, and recovery. Information-sharing 
strategies among federal, state, tribal, and private sector organizations need to be 
developed in consideration of both terrorism prevention and disaster related concerns. 
Awareness of the strong relationship between these two concerns fosters robust 
information-sharing strategies that can be adjusted to meet the overall needs of Homeland 
Security and prevent potential limiting perspectives of when and how information is to be 
shared. For example, the Washington Military Department, Emergency Management 
Division would be actively involved in a tsunami if one should occur within Washington 
state; as would the U.S. Coast Guard, FEMA, and other federal, state, tribal government 
and private sector organizations. The same agencies are actively involved in countering 
potential terrorist activities within their region on a day-to-day basis. Developing  
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information-sharing strategies that foster continuous, multi-mission, relationships 
establish fundamental linkages among these agencies that are essential for developing 
robust, technical, data sharing capabilities.  
The information technology and policy challenges faced by the United States 
today are equally critical to the success of any national information sharing strategy. 
However, agency information sharing strategy documents do not directly describe these 
challenges.  
Data sharing is today’s principal Information Technology challenge. All 
sectors—commercial, government, academic, and military—seek 
improved information exchange to achieve operational benefits, whether 
in the form of greater profits, improved situational awareness, intellectual 
advancement, or ability to respond to threats endangering respective 
interests. Nations and organizations within and across nations have set 
forth policies to promote greater data sharing, but often without 
empowering or enabling change agents to introduce measurably better 
capabilities. While progress is being made in some quarters, in others 
there is almost a counter-reaction where organizations are closing in on 
themselves, perpetuating traditional closed pockets of valuable 
information, even if sometimes having the appearance of adhering to the 
new policies. The advances are coming in fits and starts, resembling 
chaotic self-organizing systems, but with no overriding pressure to bring 
about incremental adaptive improvements. (Haye-Roth, Pullen, Blais, 
Brutzman, 2008) 
According to Hayes-Roth et al., many initiatives today are attempting to address 
the challenge of information sharing and suggest systems that presently exist do not 
provide easily implemented, quick to deliver, or affordable information sharing. They 
suggest a “smart implementation strategy” to ensure best value for cost, in as little time as 
possible, by delivering solutions for immediate operational requirements. By doing so, 
benefits of information sharing can be realized and be measurable. This perspective is 
supportive of the highly abstract strategies and policies that exist, and it focuses 
specifically on putting those policies and strategies into practice. The critical piece of this 
perspective is the development of capability that is meaningful, achievable, affordable, 
reusable, and that delivers value.  
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To deliver such capability across many different agencies, in so many different 
problem or situations, Hayes-Roth et al. argue there must be policies and processes to 
coordinate their evolution on national and international levels. They propose an approach 
that focuses primarily on developing portfolios of capability, which are logical, value-
adding collections of capabilities for particular problem domains. The capabilities 
referred to by Hayes-Roth et al are problem domain semantics, value-adding transactions, 
and components built to address the requirements related to a particular problem domain.  
An example of a capability might be a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
Notice of Arrival (NOA) transaction supported by common semantics (related to this 
particular problem domain or mission domain), and software service components. Notice 
of Arrival data enters a data source, where a transaction occurs (valued data is extracted 
for a particular user type based on user criteria), and the valued data extracted by the data 
source is understood by the user (or service) accessing it. In this case, this data could be 
the nation from which the vessel last departed. The organization requesting the data 
might be Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The originating source would be the 
Coast Guard. The data would be application independent and visible by CBP information 
technology capabilities, or shared web resources. In this case, a particular portfolio of 
capabilities is recognized that supports a specific mission domain. Organizations must 
recognize that “different concerns and problems require different semantics” (Hayes-
Roth et al., 2008). Hayes-Roth et al. argue, “…there is a need to describe how to manage 
the numerous semantic portfolios…” (2008). Hayes-Roth et al. propose a method for 
managing portfolios of capability, which is based on domains of concern–using MDA as 
an example. New components can be added to enrich information sharing capabilities by 
building on the initial capabilities within existing capability portfolios–adding value to 
transactions.  
By approaching information sharing in the manner suggested by Hayes-Roth et 
al., agencies that agree to share information can focus on specific, valuable information 
sharing transactions.  
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B. THE WATCHKEEPER DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
Two Coast Guard documents provide a basic description of operational and 
design requirements driving the WatchKeeper development project: (1) The Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD), Interagency Operations Centers Command 21, 
document, and (2) a draft design document dated 8 September 2008. In the draft design 
document, WatchKeeper is referred to as a system of systems that leverages existing 
capabilities. These existing capabilities support three different layers of functionality: (1) 
Information Presentation and Interface Layer, (2) Information Discovery and 
Understanding Layer, and (3) Information Sharing, Processing and Consolidation Layer.  
Essentially, WatchKeeper provides a means to consolidate data and existing 
application functionality to deliver collective capability. The draft detailed design 
document states that WatchKeeper is “…based on existing net-centric and service 
oriented capabilities…designed to loosely couple CG enterprise components and data 
sources” (C2CEN, 2008). The design is primarily web-based relying on backend data 
sources and virtualization to deliver reliable access to resources in an efficient, 
consolidated presentation layer. Coast Guard users can access capabilities directly 
through the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) located within the Coast Guard Data Network 
(CGDN) where port partners must utilize VPN connections to access the system.  
The following diagram depicts port partner access to WatchKeeper. 
 Figure 1.   Port Partner Access (From: C2CEN, 2008) 
WatchKeeper developers apply a spiral development to deliver capability in three 
segments. WatchKeeper is intended to have a 20-year lifecycle. Three proposed segments 
deliver capability. Segment one was to provide the following capabilities by the end of 
October 2009 (excerpt draft document IOC/C21 PMP). 
 Integrate activities that support execution of business rules, data 
consolidation, information sharing, and workflow using automation to the 
greatest extent feasible.  
 Support joint planning for vessel arrivals and security activities among key 
interagency partners. 
 Compose and maintain a situation picture. 
 Integrate activities that support execution of business rules, data 
consolidation, information sharing, and workflow using automation to the 
greatest extent feasible.  
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 Support joint planning for vessel arrivals and security activities among key 
interagency partners. 
 Compose and maintain a situation picture. 
Segment two provides a sensor and sensor management solution enabling Coast 
Guard and other agencies to share sensor capabilities. Segment two development begins 
in FY11, and continues through FY13. Segment three addresses lessons learned from 
segments one and two, with a completion and predicted deployment by the end of FY17. 
According to a draft CG C2CEN document (number IOC/C21-08-3.1-11)–Project 
Management Plan, approximately $9.1M is available to develop WatchKeeper. It is 
unclear if this dollar amount is intended to cover the entire design and development 
project or just segment one (CG C2CEN, 2008). 
The Coast Guard ORD breaks WatchKeeper system requirements into three 
categories: (1) mission requirements, (2) effectiveness requirements, and (3) non-
technical requirements. The mission requirements are intended to focus development 
efforts on business processes present in proposed Interagency Operations Centers 
(IOC’s). Effectiveness requirements describe data management requirements as they 
relate to information-sharing methodologies, such as Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA). Non-technical requirements address user issues, such as usability, and training 
time.  
The following is an excerpt from the WatchKeeper Segment one Project 
Management Plan (PMP): “WatchKeeper will transform the operational capabilities of 
the Sector Command Centers and improve tactical decision making, situational 
awareness, operations monitoring, rules based processing and joint planning in a 
coordinated interagency environment. WatchKeeper will close gaps in the Sector's 
capability to sense, understand, and share tactical information critical to security and 




To fulfill these requirements, the Coast Guard has proposed to leverage several 
pilot technologies from various sources that provide some level of capability. The Coast 
Guard intends to build and implement data services on a Coast Guard Enterprise Service 
Bus (ESB) and Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN), and to gain access to and aggregate 
DHS/OGA data sources to support the data sharing components of WatchKeeper. 
Three technologies have been considered for the presentation, interface, process, 
and collaboration aspects of the WatchKeeper system. 
 Project SeahaWatchKeeper 
 Web Common Operational Picture (Web COP) 
 Maritime Homeland Security Operations (MHS-OPS) 
Six additional existing technology capabilities provide data for WatchKeeper. 
 Maritime Awareness Global Network (MAGnet) 
 Maritime Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) 
 Common operational Web Services System (CWSS) 
 Enterprise Geospatial Information System (GIS) 
 Environmental Data Server (EDS) 
 National Automatic Identification System (NAIS) 
The following diagram provides a systems overview of WatchKeeper. 
 Figure 2.   WatchKeeper System Overview (From: C2CEN, 2008) 
Three primary capabilities for WatchKeeper segment one, which have been 
identified in the detailed design document, are: (1) Information Presentation and Interface 
Layer, (2) Information Discovery and Understanding Layer, and (3) Information Sharing, 
Processing and Consolidation Layer. 
The Information Presentation and Interface Layer (IPIL) is the primary means by 
which users, both Coast Guard and port partners, are to access WatchKeeper. The design 
requires that users be able to share presentation interfaces and workspaces based on the 
user’s role and access permissions. The purpose behind sharing presentation interfaces 
and workspaces is to fulfill three primary requirements of sharing operational awareness, 




The Information Discovery and Understanding Layer (IDUL) relies upon the 
Coast Guard ESB as a means of delivering information from various data sources. It is 
unclear what specific functionality the IDUL can provide. The Detailed Design document 
provides a brief description of the IDUL. 
The information requested on the ESB, which will be addressed in the 
following section, will be scheduled requested, processed, put in context, 
shared and acted upon within the business processes and logic of the 
understanding layer. The business processes will provide the necessary 
automated and manual functionality required to perform actions such as 
the vetting of arriving vessels, assignment of missions to available 
resources, rules-based monitoring of port activities and other critical 
functionality required to maintain port security and awareness. The 
gathering of external or partnering agency information will be acquired via 
this layer. The business processes will be established to support the 
collection, processing and sharing of this much needed local information 
as a key element of WatchKeeper. (CG C2CEN Detailed Design 
Document, 2008) 
The Information Sharing, Processing and Consolidation Layer (ISPCL) is 
described as the layer of functionality that provides data sources to support WatchKeeper 
functionality. The following are primary types of data provided: (1) intelligence 
information, (2) vessel arrival information, (3) operational information, and (4) 
situational awareness information. Additionally, the detailed design document lists types 
of supporting data: (1) weather data, (2) enterprise Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) 
layers, and (3) Search and Rescue (SAR) mission details. 
Presently, two Coast Guard organizations are responsible for developing, and 
delivering the WatchKeeper system. No evidence exists to suggest that other agencies are 
represented in the development process; however, other agencies are providing 
information to the Coast Guard Common Operational Picture (COP).  
C. WATCHKEEPER APPROACH TO INFORMATION SHARING 
Three primary high-level WatchKeeper components facilitate an information-
sharing environment: (1) enterprise data sources, (2) business logic components, and (3) 
an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB). The term–information sharing–is misleading. The 
WatchKeeper information-sharing model based on services is a method for services 
behind the Coast Guard firewall to share information among data sources owned and 
operated by the Coast Guard. WatchKeeper does not provide services that access port 
partner data sources. Port partners access WatchKeeper capabilities by VPN access only. 
This means no direct data connectivity is provided between WatchKeeper subsystems 
and disparate port partner data sources.  
Enterprise data sources store data critical to maritime operations, such as law 
enforcement information, vessel arrival information, weather information etc. These data 
sources provide information that can be shared among the various Coast Guard owned 
and operated data sources, via WatchKeeper interfaces. However, some data sources 
receive data from other sources outside of the Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN). For 
example, CG COP data stores directly receive data from DoD, CBP, NOAA, and other 
agencies. It is unclear how these data resources are integrated (or connected). They may 
have been manually integrated–normally a costly and timely endeavor (Ortiz, 2007).  
 




Business logic components are software applications hosted by Coast Guard 
Operations Systems Center (OSC) that facilitate business transactions, such as the Marine 
Information Safety and Law Enforcement system (MISLE), and enterprise GIS. These 
applications access enterprise data sources for processing business transactions. Each 
application requires the use of a separate interfaces–an issue the WatchKeeper project 
intends to address by building an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB). 
The ESB facilitates the coordination of many software services by acting as a 
message broker between them. “The ESB handles the transformation of data formats; 
routing; message acceptance, processing, and, the sending of multiple messages at the 
same time” (Ortiz, 2007). An ESB provides WatchKeeper design with functionality that 
supports single interface–merging data to display in one common operational interface.  
The Operational Requirements Document (2009) describes three primary 
purposes for information sharing to be delivered in segment one of the WatchKeeper 
design process: (1) Integrated Vessel Targeting (IVT), (2) Interagency Operational 
Planning (IOP), and (3) Operations Monitoring (OM). The requirements described in the 
Operational Requirements Document are primarily functional.  
 IVT requirements intend to facilitate coordinated vessel screening and 
boarding activities among partnering agencies.  
 IOP requirements intend to facilitate coordinated operations and 
operational planning pertaining to all other maritime missions, such as 
disaster preparedness, or law enforcement.  
 OM requirements intend to facilitate Command and Control (C2) for day-
to-day operations by providing situational awareness, scheduling, and 
collaboration capabilities.  
These requirements are designed so that port partners can access WatchKeeper 
through VPN connections and add appropriate information in support of these objectives.  
The operating requirements described herein do not address information-sharing 
transactions but focus on the functionality of hardware and software components as they 




research do not describe in detail how these requirements are to be implemented. A 
thorough investigation and analysis of the software and hardware architecture needs to be 
conducted to verify and validate such requirements.  
D. LEVERAGING EXISTING CAPABILITIES 
Many of the existing systems being leveraged are complex, homegrown, IT 
systems developed by the Coast Guard. This presents potential design risks as testing and 
evaluating the WatchKeeper architecture may identify design flaws in the existing 
products being used to support its objectives. Furthermore, quality attributes, such as 
maintainability, or reliability, may be at the mercy of these existing systems. Project 
scope is at risk of growing to encompass rework, and fixing design flaws in these 
systems. Other than building a completely new system, this research suggests that this is 
the only way to build a cost effective system, especially when considering projected 
capability delivery dates.  
A software architecture evaluation should be conducted for each supporting 
system. This would require a significant amount of work, however. WatchKeeper, as it 
stands, is intended to provide evolving capability for 20 years. No perfect solution exists 
to minimizing the risks of a project so large and complex; however, building on a 
foundation of architecture evaluation in the early stages of this endeavor minimizes some 
risks–possibly preventing costly rework in the future. The future of WatchKeeper should 
be one of advancement in capability and building on solid architectures. If WatchKeeper 
builds on broken components or a broken framework, it could become more of a 
technological burden than a value adding system supporting IOC core business processes.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of WatchKeeper segment one is to deliver the following 
capabilities: (1) Integrated Vessel Targeting (IVT), (2) Interagency Operational Planning 
(IOP), and (3) Operations Monitoring (OM). This will be accomplished by developing a 
single interface supported by and ESB that merges data from Coast Guard owned and 
operated data sources. Port partners are to be provided VPN access to enter data 
supporting these objectives.  
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The development of an ESB in itself is a complex task where methods services 
need to be developed to manage large numbers of data transactions among services. The 
documentation provided for this research does not describe in detail the ESB architecture 
providing this capability. It can be assumed that a great deal of SOA programming is 
necessary to ensure a robust ESB design.  
The term information sharing is misleading. Information-sharing technologies 
today provide capabilities for pushing and pulling data from disparate data sources 
between organizations’ primarily leverage services established to forego traditional 
technological barriers based on SOA principles. WatchKeeper limits information sharing 
by providing a basic for of network access. VPN requires port partners to agree on using 
this form of access to support WatchKeeper objectives.  
Multiple data sources and subsystems exist that can be leveraged to support 
WatchKeeper objectives–software reuse is prevalent within WatchKeeper design. 
Leveraging these systems eliminates the need to build new systems from scratch. 
However, if design flaws exist within these subsystems, a tendency may arise for 
WatchKeeper developers to fix existing issues within these systems, in turn, delaying 
WatchKeeper development. A thorough evaluation of these subsystems should be 
conducted to identify potential risks and requirements trade-offs.  
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IV. WATCHKEEPER ARCHITECTURE PROPOSAL 
A. PROPOSED APPROACH 
WatchKeeper documentation provides details surrounding development of the 
physical aspects of the Information Management System, the requirements necessary for 
delivering intended services, project management approaches, schedules, etc. The 
documentation, however, does not directly discuss processes, or issues surrounding 
semantics (such as commonly accepted terms for maritime missions), necessary to 
facilitate the effective use of information within the system. This may be a result of its 
initial design–having port partners VPN into the Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN) to 
access WatchKeeper capabilities. If this is the case, the development of a true 
information-sharing environment (based on SOA principles) requires an initiative that 
focuses on semantics for future versions of the system. 
WatchKeeper should be built to facilitate the use of three basic categories of 
information—past, present, and future (or forecast). All three categories support a shared 
world model, which is critical for enabling “efficient thought” (Hayes-Roth, 2006). To 
support efficient thought, services are provided to facilitate “Superior Decision Loops” 
(Hayes-Roth, 2006). Components of the WatchKeeper framework act to provide a cycle 
of functions: (1) Observe, (2) Assess Situation, (3) Determine Desired Changes, (4) 
Generate Candidate Plans, (5) Project Likely Outcomes, (6) Select Best Alternative Plan, 
(7) Communicate and Implement Chosen Plan, and (8) Validate and Improve Model 
(nine functions of efficient thought). This approach can be used despite the current 
information-sharing model being proposed by WatchKeeper.  
A picture of the past is necessary for a Command Duty Officer’s (CDO’s) initial 
observation and assessments when beginning his/her watch cycle; the history provides a 
context for the present and makes the present meaningful. In many cases, the CDO can be 
required to reference the past to provide information to customers outside of the 
command center. This picture of the past is supported by historical data managed by 
various sources. WatchKeeper provides services to access this information, and display it 
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in a meaningful way. Information accessed by “history” would be: recorded camera 
feeds, radio transmission, phone calls, SAR activities captured by R21 assets, sensor 
activities, vessel transit information (track data, etc.), operation summaries (within 
operational windows), critical message traffic, log entries, email, chat activities, 
notification transmissions, critical media reports, standing orders, and previous plan of 
the day. It is critical for the presentation of this material to be easily interpreted and 
accessed to avoid becoming a burden to the CDO. Authorized IOC participants should 
have a tailored perspective of this historical information–filtered/profiled to meet their 
specific requirements. The history should also provide a generic method and criteria for 
generating reports) that supports Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) requests 
(Requirement).  
The primary foundation for WatchKeeper’s “present” capability is a “shared 
world model” among participating agencies, which is necessary to “…enable 
synchronized, coordinated, intelligent real-time decision-making and control” (Hayes-
Roth, 2005). This shared world model can only realize a maximum level of efficiency if 
it is built upon a model-based communication network (MCN) that delivers information 
using specified models that feed each user’s world model (Hayes-Roth, 2005). The IOC 
environment provides a perfect case for this type of communications model. A majority 
of operational scenarios, requiring data sharing between agencies, is unique and requires 
random connections with any number of independent agencies with their own 
information needs. The “essential nature” of IOC’s is net-centric and collaborative–
“continuously synchronized though distributed” (Hayes-Roth, 2005). Once 
communications have been initially established and synchronized, the WatchKeeper 
architecture–most specifically for the “present” capability–needs only to provide a means 
for getting valued information at the right time (VIRT)–a concept developed by Dr. Rick 
Hayes-Roth (Hayes-Roth, 2005). The present WatchKeeper design requires port partners 
and other participating agencies to log into the CGDN to contribute information to the 
shared world model. Continuous synchronization of thought becomes a challenge as VPN 
connectivity must be maintained. 
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SA, therefore, is the result of a conglomerate of users participating in a 
dynamically changing world model among participating IOC member systems. 
WatchKeeper would provide a means for initially establishing communications with 
partnering agencies, and providing them a model-based communications system that 
delivers valuable information when it is needed and filters less-important information 
according to user preferences–VIRT. In the case of the Sector Seattle CDO, he/she has 
been provided clear, understandable, information about missions, events, conditions, 
vulnerabilities, and can elect to receive only information that could potentially affect 
predicted outcomes, such as a sudden change in weather forecast or maritime traffic 
volume. VIRT makes the interpretation of critical information much easier–eliminating 
information overload. 
The “forecast” capability rests upon a Model Based Communication Network 
(MCN) foundation. The future uses models provided by the MCN. A user selects the data 
most appropriate for his/her needs, and importance-level, thresholds for receiving this 
information. WatchKeeper would monitor for changes in this data that might affect 
operations, such as a significant weather change that may require the cancellation of a 
mission. It would notify the CDO if this type of change occurs, or has a higher likelihood 
of occurring. An example of future (or forecast) capability is the following. A CDO is 
expecting a joint boarding with CBP to take place six hours into the watch cycle. The 
operation requires two station boat assets. Three hours before the boarding, CBP inputs a 
change in plans–they are cancelling their boarding plans. WatchKeeper notifies the CDO 
that there is, now, an extra boat asset available for SAR, since the boarding party will not 
need two vessels to ferry personnel. The forecast capability provides CDOs with 
information that can affect future events, and which may not be readily apparent. 
The fundamental consideration for developing a framework for WatchKeeper is 
that it must support the “Shared World Model” (Hayes-Roth, 2005), which requires the 
coordination of dynamic worlds. The core of this framework must support the 
interactions of VIRT components described in the “components” section of this 
document. To accomplish this, consider the theory of “Smart Push” to describe how 
components within VIRT should interact.  
B. SMART PUSH 
“Smart Push” utilizes Conditions of Interest (COI) to establish specific, user 
defined, conditions that maximize the efficiency and value of information delivered to 
users. By defining specific conditions up front, users can avoid the traditional information 
“glut” produced by traditional query methods. For an illustration of how important it is to 
avoid “glut,” consider the following example. The CDO might make a Google query for 
current weather conditions in a particular region. This query would return too much 
information–mostly unnecessary. The CDO, in turn, must filter the majority of this 
information to find what is needed. This is an extremely inefficient and costly method for 
operators who need the most valuable information as quickly as possible.  



















Figure 4.   Smart Push (From: Hayes-Roth, 2006) 
 Explanation: 
 The second model is very similar, and it too focuses on the same 
Processing Entities PE1,…, PEk that add value by accessing various 
information sources IS1,…, ISn to produce valued products labeled 
v. In this model, however, VIRT processes are at work, enabling 
each PE to inform the system about the COIs the system should 
continuously monitor. Each PE conveys its needs through 
interaction with a Condition Specifier (CS). The function c on the 
link between the PE and CS represents the transaction that yields 
information products consistent with PE’s specification. Thus, for 
example, assume c gives a minimal amount of information at low 
cost, because the PE specifies precisely what type of events, which 




The rest of the process works roughly as follows. Once a condition 
is specified, the CS conveys it to the Condition Monitor (CM) 
through w, and CM takes responsibility for monitoring it. The 
transaction w just passes back any new events matching the 
condition through CS and then through c. The Condition Monitor 
uses various Information Directories (IDj) to understand what 
kinds of information are available and how to access them. 
Information Stores (ISn) store, manage and access discrete bodies 
of information. The processes used by CM are labeled r and s, 
representing the transactions that seek and retrieve relevant 
information (Hayes-Roth, 2006). 
C. FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS 
 “Smart Push” implemented to realize VIRT. 
 The “world model” is developed and maintained within the Coast Guard 
Data Network. 
 WatchKeeper data resources are distributed. Data derived from these 
sources feed the MCN and WatchKeeper information stores, which 
support the ever-changing “world model.”  
 The framework of this architecture was constructed under the assumption 
that a model-based communications network is available to provide 
services that correlate shared-world data. An assumption: the combined 
concepts of the “Information Discovery and Understanding Layer” and 
“Information Sharing, Processing, and Consolidation Layer” can provide 
an MCN capability using the Enterprise Service Bus, and other “Net-
Centric” capabilities identified later in Figure 3. 
 External participants should be able to access WatchKeeper and its 
services using their respective organization’s resources through secure 
connections over the internet.  
 Sensor devices are to be accessed through services provided by the 
Information sharing, Processing and Coordination layer. 
 Plans, objectives, actions, assumptions, and justifications are entered into 
WatchKeeper by users and sensors, and made visible, and accessible or 
both to maintain the shared world model. Users select Conditions Of 
Interest (COI’s) through the WatchKeeper interface. The MCN provides 
services to filter data according to COI’s so that only relevant data is 
received (see component-based product-line architecture for VIRT, and 
Two Theories of Process Design for Information Superiority: Smart Pull 
vs. Smart Push) (Hayes-Roth, 2006). 
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 Store and forward operations are ongoing between local data stores, and 
remote WatchKeeper “Authoritative data” stores.  
 Coast Guard and other participants, located within the IOC have access to 
Coast Guard Standard Workstation III interfaces to WatchKeeper and its 
services (circumstances permitting) 
D. COMPONENTS 
Most essential to the success of WatchKeeper is the support of changing world 
models to deliver a common, dynamic, shared world model.  
The following components, logic, and methodologies, where developed by Dr. 
Rick Hayes-Roth, and published in his work: Model-based Communication Networks and 
VIRT: Filtering Information by Value to Improve Collaborative Decision-Making, for the 
10th international Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2005. 
These components would serve as the core innovation behind the WatchKeeper “Watch-
standers” sub architecture proposed in this thesis. These components, and their associated 
logic, are not considered in present WatchKeeper architectural documents, and 
descriptions. 
 Figure 5.   Component-based Product-line Architecture for VIRT (From: Hayes-Roth, 
2006) 
The following components would reside within the Enterprise Service Bus and 
Net-Centric Services domain of WatchKeeper. 
 Planning Toolset (supported by CG planning tool, such as MHS-OPS, 
depicted in Figure 2)–which generates candidate plans, evaluates 
alternatives, and justifies the selections they make (p. 9). 
 Condition Monitor–examines the value of the designated condition over 
appropriate time and space coordinates and records when significant 
changes in the value of the condition occur. 
 Information Registry–facilitates the population of, and access to, Dynamic 
Situation Data (DSD)–variables, and encodings (such as AIS (WHAT 
DOES THIS ACRONYM STAND FOR-ADD TO ACRONYM LIST) or 
Blue force tracking (BFT) data). Meta-data describe this data for access by 
other components.  
 Information Domain Ontology–specifies semantics of an information 
source, as when an attribute, such as “Foreign-Flagged vessel,” as 
translated by 46 CFR 381 subpart 47.5, is explained as any vessel of 
foreign registry including vessels owned by U.S. citizens but registered in 
a nation other than the United States. 
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 Operational Domain Ontology–specifies the semantics of the participating 
planners and operators (usually artifacts of their respective agencies) (p. 
10). For example, they may need to specify that “Random Boarding” 
means–to physically embark a vessel that has not been selected for 
boarding due to any suspect information or activity (example only-may not 
reflect true specification of random boarding).  
 Domain Translator–“translates conditions and significant deltas, expressed 
in one ontology, into a different ontology.” “… the Domain Translator 
relates concerns in the operational domain to data sources described in an 
Information Registry” (p. 10) Example: a CG boarding operations 
translator could translate current requirements, such as manning 
requirements, vessel asset requirements, time requirement, etc… into 
“resource gap,” “no-go,” “resource request,” etc…  
 ** Information Directory**–it is assumed that this component is to be 
available through WatchKeeper aggregate data services.  
The following diagrams depict abstractions of essential hardware components, 
and abstractions of software components necessary to deliver, this proposed, 

















Figure 6.   WatchKeeper (After: Detailed Design Document, 2008) 
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E. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The following is a high-level, comprehensive, functional requirements list. The 
requirements listed below have been identified in the Coast Guard’s C2CEN 
WatchKeeper Detailed Design document. They are further refined to meet the functional 
requirements of VIRT. 
Support joint planning for vessel arrivals and security activities among key 
interagency partners. The Coast Guard is still working on identifying the consolidated 
planning tool, although the design document references MHS-OPS as the available 
solution. For the purpose of this thesis, it is assumed that a planning tool has been chosen. 
 Assign resources to tasking; a requirement addressed by the selected, joint 
planning tool  
 VIRT Functional Requirements 
 Integrate activities that support execution of business rules, data 
consolidation, information sharing, and workflow using automation to the 
greatest extent feasible. (The primary necessity and chief technical 
challenge to this requirement is the development of VIRT components as 
previously described). 
 Accept COI’s 
 Monitor conditions established by COI’s–if information changes, and 
those changes are significant to affect assumptions about current or future 
concerns–Alert 
 Seek and retrieve relevant information based on changes in conditions 
being monitored 
 Alert 
 Access data from disparate resources 
 Coordinate MCN services, and WatchKeeper resources 
 Compose and maintain a situation picture–result of “Smart Push” (This 
refers to the development of a “Shared World Model” as previously 
described). 
 Filter data to provide only “valued information at the right time”–result of 
“Smart Push” 
 Deliver predictions of the world model based on deltas in information, and 
operational ontologies able to deliver predictions by monitoring COI’s.  
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F. PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS 
Several quality attributes are applicable to WatchKeeper–Watch-standers sub-
architecture. They include the following (some of which are listed in the Coast Guard’s 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD): usability, modifiability, availability, ability 
to facilitate communication and coordination, ability to forecast issues, compatibility, and 
reusable artifact. This list is not all-inclusive. However, the VIRT method described by 
Dr. Hayes-Roth, being the single most important consideration for this architecture, has 
its own critical Quality Attributes ubiquitous in any collaborative, command and control 
(C2), operational environment. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on two WatchKeeper, 
Quality Attributes critical to VIRT, efficiency and usability. 
Efficiency refers to those qualities that enable efficient process to obtain VIRT, 
such as the ability to filter information based on value criteria, monitor for changes in 
shared world views, coordinate the shared world view, modify COI’s, etc.  
Usability refers to qualities that provide a logical, functional, visually appealing 
WatchKeeper interface. Providing VIRT capability requires that WatchKeeper provide an 
operating environment easy to use and delivers information in a meaningful way. 
G. EXAMPLE QUALITY ATTRIBUTE SCENARIOS 
Two scenarios were used as examples to describe further how key functionality of 
the architecture might be validated–specifically, to ensure functionality meets priority 
quality attributes associated with VIRT: Usability, Efficiency (Oros, 2005). 
 Normal Operation–Monitoring maritime environment 

















Figure 9.   Target Vessel Selected for Boarding is Late (2) 
H. ARCHITECTURE PROPOSAL RISKS 
The following is a list of risks associated with this proposed architecture, and 
proposals to mitigate them. This list is not all inclusive.  
 This proposal covers a very limited number of quality attributes scenarios 
to validate the architecture.  
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 A more in-depth validation of this proposal would require the 
development of many more scenarios specifically designed to test the 
architecture at different levels of activity, and coordination. 
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 This approach requires VIRT software components to be built. The value 
of success of WatchKeeper depends on the Coast Guard’s acceptance of 
VIRT (or a similar model). The official design documents for 
WatchKeeper do not address any such model. 
 Introduce WatchKeeper developers to this approach. 
 Too watch-stander centric; Coast Guard watch-standers are not the only 
WatchKeeper participants. 
 Further development of the WatchKeeper architecture needs to consider 
other agency views of the system. 
 Presently, WatchKeeper is not being designed to allow port partners 
ubiquitous access to WatchKeeper functionality. This proposal may not 
work within the present WatchKeeper architecture.  
I. ARCHITECTURE PROPOSAL CONCLUSIONS 
WatchKeeper must provide the capability to see, understand, and share tactical 
information critical to security and interagency coordination. This explicitly identifies a 
need to share world views in an operational environment. World views are dynamic and 
content rich. Watch-standers and operators, tasked with seeing, understanding, and 
sharing information, can be quickly overcome by information “glut.” “Glut” prevents 
them from working efficiently, and most effectively. Much of their time is spent filtering 
through or ignoring information in an attempt to gain awareness of the dynamic world 
unfolding around them. This can lead to gross inefficiencies and, in some cases, failure to 
identify critical information. The WatchKeeper architecture addresses this by utilizing a 
framework based on model-based communications networks and valued information at 
the right time. It employs components that make VIRT possible using a “smart push” 
approach. Furthermore, WatchKeeper must provide an interface that supports the seeing, 
understanding, and sharing critical information. Both having the ability to retrieve only 
valuable information efficiently and having a user-friendly interface (for receiving and 
providing information) are necessary for developing a useful, shared world model. 
The success of WatchKeeper is dependent upon the acceptance of VIRT 
principles. In dynamic operating environments, where decisions need to be made quickly 
with a maximum amount of certainty, there is not time for filtering through large amounts 
of data. 
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This proposal redirects user requirements, defined by WatchKeeper design 
documents, by grouping them into time domains: past, present, and future. Focusing on 
past, present, and future time domains assists in mapping proposed WatchKeeper 
capabilities to core IOC business processes–in support of shared world models.  
VIRT creates valuable and efficient relationships between organizations that share 
a world model. The framework and components of WatchKeeper have the potential for 
delivering truly superior decision loops by improving the quality of decisions, eliminating 
“glut,” and increasing the timeliness of responses if VIRT principles are integrated into 
its design. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Coast Guard WatchKeeper development project faces many challenges–short 
timelines for delivering capability, complex requirements, limited funds, and a host of 
other issues. Most importantly, today’s port safety and security environments need the 
capabilities WatchKeeper proposes, such as common interfaces to existing IT resources 
for the maritime environment, shared awareness of safety and security activities among 
key maritime stakeholders, and methods for delivering value-added data transactions that 
enable shared awareness and coordinated maritime operations. Research suggests that the 
WatchKeeper development approach is reasonable considering the challenging 
environment, and present constraints within which it is being built. Much of the 
documentation surrounding its development is consistent concerning requirements, 
available resources, and scope; however, the project, as a whole, requires greater effort, 
much more time, and unprecedented support to deliver all the capability is proposes.  
This research began by covering three critical components to planning and 
leveraging IT capabilities: Enterprise Architecture (EA), Software Architecture (SA), and 
Software Architecture Evaluation (SAE). None of these critical components was visibly 
present in the design documents surrounding WatchKeeper development.  
EA provides a means for building strategies that align IT capabilities with core 
business processes.  
An enterprise architecture is a plan of record, a blue print of the permitted 
structure, arrangement, configuration, functional groupings/partitioning, 
interfaces, data, protocols, logical functionality, integration, technology, of 
IT resources needed to support a corporate or organizational business 
function or mission. (Minoli, 2008)  
The Coast Guard is presently developing an EA, but according to a report written 
in 2009 from the Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, the 
Coast Guard EA does not demonstrate how all the Coast Guard’s major information 
systems fit together, and the documentation that supports the EA is incomplete. 
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Developing a system of systems, such as WatchKeeper, in an environment where EA has 
not been fully implemented, creates difficulties for future systems and data integration. 
For example, documentation of the WatchKeeper framework and Components, as they 
relate to core business processes, are very difficult to develop and explain, given the 
complexity of existing data connections and future service related data connections. EA 
requires a thorough understanding of how these data connections and future service 
related data connections fit into the overarching architecture (EA). If present 
documentation does not consider future EA requirements, it may be very difficult to 
express how WatchKeeper supports core business processes, and how it meets standards 
set by DHS and Coast Guard EA policies. Developing WatchKeeper without 
understanding its relationship to greater Coast Guard information systems and business 
process is risky. The WatchKeeper project would benefit significantly from focusing its 
design and documentation efforts toward fulfilling standards and requirements of Coast 
Guard’s proposed EA plan–although, by doing this, the project management risks 
increasing workloads and extending project timelines.  
SA is a critical requirement similar to EA except that it focuses specifically on the 
architecture of software systems. Several software components exist within 
WatchKeeper; however, the architectures for these components are not represented in the 
WatchKeeper design documents. The risk in attaching components (in this case, software 
products) that do not have a formal software architecture is the behaviors of these 
components are hard to trace when combining them with new services that specifically 
support WatchKeeper. If software bugs exist in third-party components, a tendency may 
exist to make compromises in quality attributes to deliver WatchKeeper functionality. 
This may also lead WatchKeeper developers to fix problems that exist within third-party 
components–a costly and timely undertaking, which may cause significant delays in 
product delivery time and an increase in overall project cost overruns.  
The WatchKeeper project should maintain a clear vision of how this system 
provides value to both the Coast Guard, and other IOC stakeholders. One objective that 
summarizes the majority of WatchKeeper’s proposed capabilities is valuable information 
to the right person at the right time. A thorough SAE should provide enough information 
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for stakeholders and program managers to understand clearly how the software 
architecture fulfills this objective. Much of the design documents provided for this 
research define data connections, capabilities that exist, and how these capabilities are to 
merged to meet operational requirements.  
Port partner agencies should be intimately involved in WatchKeeper 
development. Presently, there are no formal agreements between the Coast Guard and 
other WatchKeeper stakeholders establishing coordinated development of the 
WatchKeeper IMS. This situation presents the risk of delivered capabilities not meeting 
requirements of other WatchKeeper stakeholders. The success of WatchKeeper depends 
on stakeholder acceptance and use of the system. 
Semantics of operational domains across partnering agencies can present design 
issues within WatchKeeper. Data, needing to be shared across multiple agencies, must 
use common semantics to ensure data integrity and common understanding. 
WatchKeeper design must consider semantics. Documentation available for this research 
did not reflect consideration for semantics. 
Presently, the design for WatchKeeper relies on existing technological 
capabilities, such as vessel arrival information from various data sources. These data 
sources have been established by manually connecting to sources outside of the Coast 
Guard network (outside of WatchKeeper proposed data services). This may create 
complications in design considerations since these connections rely on systems outside of 
Coast Guard influence and control. For example, if errors in applications and data 
sources, that reside outside the Coast Guard network, begin to occur it would be difficult 
to resolve these errors. Such an effort would require a coordinated effort to fix such errors 
– this also presupposes the responsible organization would be concerned with fixing the 
errors. These data connections should be re-established by means of WatchKeeper 
services design principles. This would ensure that all data that supports WatchKeeper 
capabilities is accessed in a logical, consistent, and concise manor. By re-establishing 
these data connections through services (within the WatchKeeper IMS), documentation 
and design can be consistent throughout the overall design process–limiting the number 
of ad hoc connections and processes to establish functionality. 
 54
It is unclear if available funds for WatchKeeper development, totaling 9.1 million 
dollars, are solely designated for segment one capabilities. The amount of 9.1 million 
dollars seems a very small amount of capital investment considering the design 
challenges presented in this research. If this is the total amount of funds to deliver initial 
and future capabilities up through segment three, the Coast Guard risks running into high 
cost-overruns, and significant delays in delivering products. Benchmarking other similar 
on-going development processes, in either the public or government sectors, may provide 
WatchKeeper program managers visibility into costing methods, and cost predictions. By 
doing so, program managers may find approaches that help them gauge where the 
WatchKeeper project stands from a cost perspective.  
The Coast Guard is relying heavily on existing system capabilities to deliver 
proposed WatchKeeper functionality. The ESB is one component of WatchKeeper that 
will help to merge the functionality of existing systems. However, it has not been 
developed. This ESB must be designed. Significant effort is required in the design and 
development of this ESB. Services from the host of applications supporting WatchKeeper 
needs to be integrated and managed by this service. Presently, the development of the 
ESB does not consider services outside the Coast Guard Data Network. Future 
development should consider how to implement services effectively from other 
partnering organizations to ensure WatchKeeper’s use by agencies other than the Coast 
Guard.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis was developed to address the following questions: (1) what are the 
significant challenges facing the Coast Guard in developing this IMS? (2) is the Coast 
Guard leveraging best-practices (as identified by research) to develop WatchKeeper? (3) 
what is the primary focus of the WatchKeeper development approach? and (4) how might 




It is evident that the Coast Guard is attempting to apply best practices in the 
development of WatchKeeper; however, it is not readily apparent that any formal process 
exists to ensure these practices are priorities or that these practices yield value as depicted 
in literature. Three primary best practices should be integrated into the WatchKeeper 
development project: (1) Enterprise Architecture, (2) Software Architecture, and (3) 
Software Architecture Evaluation. Coordinating the application of these best practices 
ensures the objectives of WatchKeeper can be met while reducing the risks associated 
with this complex endeavor. EA can ensure WatchKeeper is developed in accordance 
with Coast Guard overarching IT strategies and core business processes. SA can provide 
meaningful and concrete contexts for business process owners to understand how 
WatchKeeper supports their operations better. SA can also provide differing levels of 
abstraction that enable clear understanding of how the WatchKeeper components fit 
together in a framework that delivers valuable capability to customers. SAE can be used 
primarily as a risk mitigating strategy to identify critical design decisions in early stages 
of WatchKeeper development. The focus of software evaluation is on scenario based 
analysis of quality attributes, which WatchKeeper designers should be addressing pre-
deployment to identify design trade-offs, and potential design risks by  using various 
means of testing and analysis, such as quality attribute scenarios. The architecture 
proposal section of this thesis provides an example of quality attribute scenarios.  
VIRT is a concept developed by Dr. Rick Hayes-Roth, which focuses specifically 
on delivering valuable information when users need it most–particularly, in information-
sharing environments that leverage disparate data sources across multiple organizations. 
VIRT methodologies can enhance WatchKeeper capabilities by eliminating “information 
glut” being experienced by today’s Watch-standers. This thesis provides a scenario 
describing the information rich environment present in Coast Guard command centers 
today.  
What is the primary focus of the WatchKeeper development approach? The 
primary focus of WatchKeeper development is on the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB). The 
proposed ESB manages the many services provided by the many systems supporting 
WatchKeeper capability. Primarily, the ESB provides a means of managing simple 
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message services between existing systems. The ESB then provides a means of 
coordinating this information in such a way as to be displayed using a single 
WatchKeeper interface. Today, the ESB is only concerned with systems owned and 
operated solely by the Coast Guard. Future renditions of the ESB should consider the 
integration of services from other partnering agencies–barring any security concerns that 
can prevent this from being achieved.  
How might the WatchKeeper development team ensure the right capabilities are 
delivered to their customers? Most importantly, by applying the principles of EA, SA, 
SAE, and VIRT, the development team is sure to test the requirements gathered in early 
stages of WatchKeeper development. VIRT, in particular, places the capability defining 
what information is necessary in the hands of users, who can define what information is 
pertinent to them, when this information should be pulled, and how this information 
should be displayed. The design documents reflect a significant effort toward gathering 
user requirements; however, no specific, detailed descriptions (within the documentation 
provided) exist of how WatchKeeper can address these user requirements other than 
identifying existing systems that generally meet these requirements.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although segment one of WatchKeeper development is well underway, the 
overall project is still in its infancy. The author believes the task at hand is much greater 
than the Coast Guard anticipated. The state in which the WatchKeeper project finds itself 
provides a wealth of research opportunities ranging from its alignment with the Coast 
Guard’s future enterprise architecture to local IOC information system architectures.  
Future research should seriously consider the impact of organization-wide 
enterprise architecture. Does the Coast Guard have a mature understanding of what 
enterprise architecture provides, or how to implement it? The federal government is 
driving EA–with the DoD’s architectural framework being one of the larger initiatives. 
There is a race to overtake the quickly shrinking cycle of new technologies, and the 
growing cost and complexity of existing IT systems. The Coast Guard has not yet been 
able to provide a clear picture of its ever-growing IT portfolio (Office of Inspector 
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General, Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The organization must develop 
standards, procedures, and policies that facilitate strategic plans for future IT 
development, and help it manage its current capabilities. WatchKeeper is intended to 
have a 20-year life cycle. At some point, WatchKeeper needs to integrate its architecture 
with that of the overarching EA. What can be done in the early stages of its design to 
ensure its compliance with future EA policies? How does WatchKeeper map to Coast 
Guard core business practices? Is the current design flexible enough to fit the future 
needs of the Coast Guard? 
As the design of WatchKeeper pushes ahead, a significant amount of data needs 
to be developed concerning the software architecture aspects of WatchKeeper. A 
thorough investigation of the Coast Guard’s software development practices might serve 
to identify where the Coast Guard is succeeding and where the organization could 
leverage best practices to ensure quality products are being created. The latest 
Commandant Instruction concerning software development is outdated. It was written in 
1996. Much has changed in the way of developing software. Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) is an example of such a change. More than ever before, organizations 
are finding innovative means for sharing information across traditional system 
boundaries. Present WatchKeeper design applies older, much less flexible techniques for 
achieving data sharing. How might the Coast Guard leverage new software development 
practices to ensure value software products are being delivered to both Coastguardsman 
and other partnering agencies?  
Port partner buy-in is a crucial element to the success of both the WatchKeeper 
initiative and the Interagency Operation Center projects. Research might be conducted to 
discover methods for planning and implementing joint software development projects–
focused specifically on information sharing. Future research might also consider 
investigating the organizational aspects of collaboration, which fuel interagency 
collaboration. WatchKeeper design documents do not address port partner user 




consider: (1) who does the Coast Guard need to share information with to achieve 
enhanced operational coordination? and (2) which agencies should be top priorities with 
respect to building information sharing capabilities?  
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